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Case No. 20080243-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of burglary, two counts of 
criminal mischief, one count of theft, two counts of theft by receiving stolen 
property, and one count of manufacturing or possessing burglary tools. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendant appealed the judgment in this case, and this Court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely. Following that decision, the 
trial court entered an amended judgment to correct an inadvertent error in the 
original judgment. Did the amended judgment restart defendant's time for filing an 
appeal from his convictions? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss for 
alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers? 
Standard of Review. "A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question 
of law which [this Court] review[s] for correctness giving no particular deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions." State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, % 10,975 P.2d 
489. 
3. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 11,15,103 
P.3d 699, and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (West 2004) 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled substance, 
burglary, criminal mischief, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft, theft by 
receiving stolen property, and unlawful possession of burglary tools. Rl-3. 
Defendant filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss for alleged violations 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and a motion to suppress evidence found 
in defendant's vehicle. R94,99. The trial court denied those motions. R349:7,49;see 
also R350:87~89. The trial court conducted a jury trial, and the jury returned verdicts 
finding defendant guilty on eight of ten counts. R237-240. On count 8, the jury 
found defendant guilty of theft by receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor. 
R237-39 (jury verdict) (reproduced in Addendum B). 
On March 14,2007, the court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to six 
concurrent indeterminate terms of zero to five years on six convictions for third 
degree felonies and to two concurrent jail terms on two misdemeanor convictions. 
R320. In so doing, the court listed defendant's two convictions of theft by receiving 
stolen property, counts 8 and 9, as third degree felonies, R320, where the verdict 
form listed count 9 as a third degree felony but count 8 as only a class B 
misdemeanor. R238. 
On March 11,2008, almost one year later, defendant filed his notice of appeal. 
R376. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Just before midnight on August 16, 2006, police officer Brad Hansen, 
responded to a burglary alarm at the Logan Top Spot convenience store. Upon 
arriving, he encountered defendant in the store's parking lot. R349:14-16, 18. 
Defendant was running from the northwest door and said that he was jogging. 
R349:17. Officer Hansen, aware of many false alarms, allowed defendant to 
continue on his way. R349:16. 
Almost immediately, however, Officer Hansen discovered burglary tools near 
the northwest door of the store and found that the door's lock had been popped. 
R349:16-18. He looked around for defendant and saw that defendant had climbed 
into the cab of a semi-truck parked in the car wash lot just east of the Top Spot. 
R349:18, 36. Officer Hansen approached the truck, and defendant jumped out, 
saying, "I didn't do it. I didn't do it." R349:19. 
Back-up arrived, and Officer Hansen left defendant with Officer Ostermiller. 
R349:20. Officer Ostermiller began getting defendant's information and ran a 
warrants check. R349:20, 22. 
Officer Hansen and a second back-up officer returned to the Top Spot, 
seeking additional evidence. R349:20. Officer Hansen walked over to the truck, 
stepped up onto the driver's door area, and looked in through the open driver's 
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window. R349:20. He saw miscellaneous tools in the passenger cab, including a 
gas-powered chop saw. R349:20-22. 
Officer Hansen then returned to defendant, telling him that he was being 
detained for a possible burglary. R349:22. At that point, Officer Ostermiller told 
Officer Hansen that he had located an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. 
R349:22. The officers arrested defendant and transported him to the police 
department. R349:22-23. 
Prior to impounding the truck, police performed an inventory search. 
R349:36-37. Burglary tools were found in the cab of defendant's truck, as was 
evidence of criminal activity at other locations. R349:37-40. Additional facts are set 
forth in the portion of the brief addressing defendant's challenge to the denial of his 
motion to suppress. See Point III, below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
, 1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal. The trial court 
entered judgment on March 14, 2007. Defendant filed his first notice of appeal on 
April 20, 2007. In an earlier case, this Court held that defendant's notice of appeal 
was not timely. Moreover, this Court also held that a July 30,2007 addendum to the 
judgment did not restart the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
5 
On February 12, 2008, the district court filed an amended judgment. The 
amended judgment corrected a clerical error and an illegal sentence. It did not, 
however, restart the time for filing an appeal. 
2. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss for an 
alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers, which provides rules "to encourage the expeditious and 
orderly disposition of . . . charges [outstanding in one jurisdiction against a 
defendant imprisoned in another jurisdiction]" did not apply to any matter in this 
case. Defendant was not detained on the basis of outstanding charges in another 
jurisdiction. 
3. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Assuming 
that defendant was subject to a search governed by the Fourth Amendment, the 
search was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Evidence discovered was also admissible because defendant's arrest on an 
outstanding warrant provided an independent lawful basis for a post-arrest truck 
search. His arrest provided grounds for a lawful search incident to arrest, and the 
need to impound his vehicle provided grounds for a lawful inventory search. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AND MUST DISMISS 
THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT 
TIMELY 
Defendant did not timely file his notice of appeal, and this Court therefore 
lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 
Proceedings below. Defendant filed three notices of appeal in this case. 
He filed notices of appeal from the judgment, from an addendum to the 
judgment, and from an amended judgment. 
Judgment. On March 14, 2007, the trial court entered its judgment. R319 
(reproduced in Addendum C). In listing the charges and convictions in the final 
judgment and sentence, the trial court correctly recorded that the jury had found 
defendant guilty on count 8, theft by receiving stolen property, but erroneously 
recorded it as a third degree felony rather than as a class B misdemeanor. Compare 
R238 with R319. The court therefore imposed the statutory indeterminate term for a 
third degree felony, rather than the term for a class B misdemeanor. R320. 
Defendant filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal from this judgment on 
April 20, 2007. R327. 
Addendum to judgment. On July 30, 2007, the trial court entered an 
"addendum to sentence, judgment, commitment/7 R344 (reproduced in Addendum 
7 
D). The addendum noted that "[t]he Defendant has a pending Federal case, or is on 
Federal Parole any details of which this Court is uninformed/' R344. The 
addendum stated that "[t]his Court had at the time of sentencing expressed the 
intention that this sentence is to run concurrent with any Federal cou[n]t. This 
Order is in clarification that the state's case is not to run consecutive to any 
proceedings by the Federal authorities and that this sentence can be served 
concurrent at any applicable Federal institution or the Utah State Prison/7 R345. 
On August 15,2007, defendant filed an amended notice of appeal, appealing 
from the order entered on July 30, 2007. R347. 
Dismissal of appeal. On November 1,2007, this Court dismissed defendant's 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See State v. Swenson (Swenson I), 2007 UT App 359U 
(reproduced in Addendum E). The Court reasoned that defendant had only thirty 
days after the entry of the March 14,2007 judgment within which to appeal. Id. The 
Court noted that defendant had filed his notice of appeal on April 20, 2007, thirty-
seven days after the entry of his sentence and outside the time to appeal. Id. 
This Court also addressed defendant's argument that the July 30, 2007 
addendum to his sentence re-started the time for his appeal and that his second 
notice of appeal was therefore timely. Id. This Court held that the addendum did 
not constitute a material change in the judgment, but merely clarified the substance 
of the judgment, and therefore did not enlarge the time for appeal. Id. 
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Amended judgment. On February 12, 2008, following remittitur, the trial 
court entered "amended minutes —sentence, judgment, commitment/' R370-73 
(reproduced in Addendum F); see also R370-71 ("minutes— in court note"). The 
amended judgment had only two changes. First, the amended judgment listed the 
conviction on count 8, theft by receiving stolen property, as a class B misdemeanor. 
R372. Thus, the court corrected the mistake inadvertently included in the original 
judgment, which listed count 8 as a third degree felony even though the verdict 
form listed it as a class B misdemeanor. Second, the amended judgment reduced 
the fine and surcharge on the conviction from the maximum allowable amount for a 
third degree felony to the maximum allowable amount for a class B misdemeanor. 
See R375; see also Utah Code Ann. § 51-9-401 (West Supp. 2008) (surcharges); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004) (indeterminate terms for felony convictions); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004) (terms for misdemeanor convictions); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-301 (West 2004) (fines); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-601 (West Supp. 2008) 
(security surcharge). 
These were the only changes. The court simply copied the original judgment, 
made the two changes, and signed the amended minutes on February 12,2008. See 
R372-75. 
Defendant filed "a notice of appeal of his sentence, judgment and 
conviction" on March 11, 2008. R376. He apparently relies on that notice of 
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appeal in invoking the court's jurisdiction to review the claims he now brings on 
appeal. See id. His appeal, however, does not assert that the trial court erred in 
amending the judgment. Rather, defendant attacks his conviction, claiming that 
the trial court erred in its October 2006 pretrial rulings. See Br. Appellant at 8-21. 
Relevant law. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of 
final judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In a criminal case, the entry of a sentence 
constitutes the final order. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, f 4,57 P.2d 1065. Thus, 
"the [thirty]-day period for filing [a] notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is 
jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by [the appellate] [c]ourt." Id. at f^ 5 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
"The rule governing amended judgments in Utah is well settled." Swenson I, 
2007 UT App 359U. Substantive modifications of the judgment enlarge the time for 
appeal, but minor or non-substantive modifications do not. See State v. Garner, 2005 
UT 6, f 11, 106 P.3d 729 (where a judgment is modified or amended "in some 
material matter, the time begins to run from the time of the modification or 
amendment"; where the amendment or modification does not "chang[e] the 
substance or character of the judgment," the amendment or modification "relates 
back to the time the original judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the time 
for appeal") (quotation and citation omitted). 
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The criminal rules provide for the correction of certain errors at any time. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) governs clerical error, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) governs 
illegal sentences. 
Clerical error, "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 
at any time . . . . " Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). "A clerical error, as contradistinguished 
from judicial error, is not the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning 
and determination. , , State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388,1389 (Utah 1988) (citation and 
quotation omitted). "To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, [a reviewing 
court] will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written 
judgment/7 Id. The correction of a clerical error "merely constitutes an amendment 
or modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment." Gamer, 
2005 UT 6, Tf 11 (citation and quotation omitted). The entry of the correction is 
therefore "merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original 
judgment was entered." Swenson 1,2007 UT App 359U, quoting Gamer, 2005 UT 6, % 
11 (citation and quotation omitted). Such an amendment is "not sufficient to enlarge 
the time to appeal." Id. 
Illegal sentences. "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "[A] rule 
22(e) illegal sentence is a 'patently7 illegal sentence or a "manifestly illegal 
11 
sentence." State v ThorMson, 2004 UT App 9, \ 15, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. 
Brooks, 908 R2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), and State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, | 5,48 R3d 
228). "A 'patently7 or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two 
situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id. (citation omitted). "[A]n 
appellate court may not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when 
the substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the 
underlying conviction." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859. 
Analysis. In this case, two errors occurred in the original March 14, 2007 
judgment. See R319-22. The trial court corrected both errors in its February 12, 
2008 amended judgment. See R372-75. As explained below, the correction of the 
clerical error did not restart the time for an appeal. Moreover, the correction of 
the illegal sentence provided no basis for review of the claims defendant now 
raises, which are challenges, not to the new sentence, but to the underlying 
conviction. 
Clerical error. The first error occurred when the trial court entered the 
conviction on count eight for a third degree felony, rather than for a class B 
misdemeanor. In preparing the March 14, 2007 "minutes — sentence, judgment, 
commitment," the court clerk inadvertently listed the conviction on count 8 as a 
third degree felony, despite the jury verdict finding a class B misdemeanor. See 
12 
R319. The trial court, not recognizing the error, signed the document, entering an 
erroneous judgment. See R322. 
This was a clerical error. See United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247,1252 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (error in entering judgment for wrong crime was clerical error); Bowie-
Myles v. United States, 2006 WL 2092286, *3 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (unpublished) 
(reproduced in Addendum G) (error in entering judgment for wrong crime was 
"clerical in nature," a "scrivener's error"). The clerk who recorded count 8 as a third 
degree felony merely mistranscribed the information on the verdict form when 
preparing the amended judgment. The trial court, not realizing the error, signed the 
document. The error "ar[ose] from oversight or omission." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). 
The error was "not the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and 
determination." State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
Thus, the trial court acted properly when it corrected the error. The amended 
judgment entered on February 12, 2008 "merely constitutes an amendment or 
modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment," and "is 
merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment 
was entered." Swenson I, 2007 UT App 359U, quoting Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 11 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
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This amendment, the correction of a clerical error, was "not sufficient to 
enlarge the time to appeal/7 See id.; see also United States v. Vortillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 
1164-66 (11th Cir. 2004) (clerical error in judgment can be corrected at any time 
under rule 36, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but correction does not restart 
period of time for appealing other matters). 
Illegal sentence. The second error occurred when the trial court imposed the 
statutory indeterminate sentence for a third degree felony on count 8. The sentence 
was a legal sentence for a third degree felony conviction, but not a legal sentence for 
a class B misdemeanor. Once the court corrected the degree of the conviction of 
count 8, the illegality of the sentence imposed in the original judgment became 
apparent. That sentence was patently or manifestly illegal because the sentence was 
"beyond the authorized statutory range" for a class B misdemeanor. Thorkelson, 
2004 UT App 9, f 15 (citation omitted). 
Because the sentence was an illegal sentence, the trial court had jurisdiction to 
correct that sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The trial court corrected the illegal 
sentence when it entered its February 12, 2008 amended judgment sentencing 
defendant "to a term of 180 day(s)" on the class B misdemeanor count of theft by 
receiving stolen property. See R374. 
But the trial court's correction of the illegal sentence does not provide 
grounds for review of his conviction on appeal. Utah Appellate courts have 
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consistently held that "an appellate court may not 'review the legality of a sentence 
[under rule 22(e)] when the substance of the appeal is, as it is here, a challenge, not 
to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction/" See State v. Finlayson, 2000 
UT10, | 8,994 P.2d 1243 (quoting Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859); see also State v. Babbel, 813 
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991). 
Here, defendant moved for a correction in the judgment to reflect that his 
sentence on count 8 was for a misdemeanor. See R360-62. The court granted that 
motion, corrected the error, and imposed a new sentence within the legal 
parameters for the misdemeanor conviction. Defendant may not obtain review of 
his claim regarding alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or 
his claim that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress by appealing 
from the trial court's order imposing the new and legal sentence. As explained, an 
appellate court may not review an appeal from an order regarding an illegal 
sentence "'when the substance of the appeal is, as it is here, a challenge, not to the 
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction/" Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ 8, 
quoting Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860. Defendant's claims are challenges not to his 
sentence, but to his underlying conviction. 
In sum, defendant's claims on appeal challenge his conviction. Defendant 
could have raised these claims by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the 
March 14, 2007 judgment entering his convictions. He did not. He cannot now 
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appeal these matters in the context of an appeal from the trial court's correction of a 
clerical error because the correction of a clerical error does not restart the time for 
appeal. Neither can he appeal them in the context of an appeal from the correction 
of an illegal sentence, as his challenge is not to the new sentence, but to his 
conviction. 
Because defendant did not timely file his original appeal and because he has 
no other avenue for appeal, this Court must dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
n. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS; THE STATE DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
Even if this Court decides that it has jurisdiction, it must affirm defendant's 
conviction because his underlying claims are without merit. Defendant first asserts 
that "this Court should dismiss this action7' because "the State violated the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers [IAD]." Br. Appellant at 9,14 (boldface and capitalization 
omitted). Defendant appears to claim that the State obtained custody of defendant 
through the Agreement, but violated the Agreement, including its anti-shuttling 
provisions. See id. at 8-19. As a consequence, defendant asserts, the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to address the charges or that, even assuming jurisdiction, the 
trial court should have dismissed the charges with prejudice. See id. In making 
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these claims, defendant misapprehends both defendant's custody status and the 
reach of the IAD. 
Proceedings below. On August 24,2006, defendant posted bond to guarantee 
that he would appear at the hearings in his case. R19. On January 28, defendant 
failed to appear. R20-21. The trial court noted on the record that it had received a 
facsimile from Salt Lake County indicating that defendant had been booked on 
several felonies and misdemeanors on August 27 and was "currently [being held] in 
[the] S.L.A.D.C. [without] bail." R22. The trial court then issued a no-bail bench 
warrant for defendant's arrest. R21. Defendant was transported from Salt Lake 
County and appeared before the trial court on September 12. R31. The court 
recalled the warrant and reinstated defendant's bail. R31. On September 13, the 
Cache County jail received a federal hold or detainer, asking the jail to notify the 
federal marshal before releasing defendant because defendant was wanted on an 
arrest warrant charging him with violating the conditions of his parole on a federal 
offense. R129. The federal hold specifically noted that the requirements of the IAD 
did not apply to this detainer. Id. 
On October 17,2006, defendant filed a "motion to dismiss [the charges against 
him] for lack of jurisdiction for the State's failure to comply with the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers." R99. In his supporting memorandum, see R100-43, 
defendant made the claims that are now reproduced almost verbatim in his brief on 
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appeal. Compare Rl00-10 with Br. Appellant at 8-19. He claimed that when his bail 
was reinstated, he was entitled to release from the jail and that he was thereafter 
held in the jail only because the federal marshal had sent the hold to the jail 
personnel. See R106. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the 
motion. R145; see also R349:2-7 (argument and ruling on motion). The court ruled 
that defendant remained in state custody, even when he was out on bail, and that 
the federal hold did not transfer him to federal custody because it only requested 
notification prior to defendant's release so that federal authorities might then 
assume custody. R349:2-7. Before sentencing, the trial court entered a 
memorandum decision memorializing its denial of the motion to dismiss. R312. 
Analysis. Defendant's claim fails. Defendant was in State custody at all times 
relevant to this case and not subject to the requirements of the IAD. 
History and purpose of the IAD, Congress enacted the IAD in 1970, joining 
the Unites States as a "member State" or party to the Agreement. United States v. 
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340,343 (1978); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (West 2004). Utah 
became a party to the agreement in 1980. See 1980 Utah Laws 188; see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-5. The Agreement "is designed 'to encourage the expeditious 
and orderly disposition of . . . charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and 
determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations, or complaints.'" Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343 (quoting Art. I of 
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the Agreement). "It prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for 
trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the 
prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against 
him in another jurisdiction/' Id. But, in either case, "the provisions of the 
Agreement are triggered only when a 'detainer' is filed with the custodial (sending) 
State by another State (receiving) having untried charges against the prisoner." Id. 
"Article IV(e) requires the dismissal of the indictment against a prisoner who is 
obtained by a receiving State if he is returned to his original place of imprisonment 
without first being tried on the indictment underlying the detainer and request by 
which custody of the prisoner was secured." Id. at 345 n.4; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-5. This provision "demonstrates a concern of the Agreement that prisoners 
not be shuttled back and forth between penal institutions" in different jurisdictions. 
Id. at 361 & n.26. 
Defendant's claims. Defendant claims that he was in federal custody when 
the State brought him to court, even though he was at that time incarcerated in the 
Cache County jail. See Br. Appellant at 14. He argues that although he had been 
incarcerated at the Cache County jail on the charges in this case, he had posted bail, 
was entitled to release, was held in jail only because federal authorities had placed a 
hold on his release, and was therefore no longer in state custody but rather in 
federal custody. See id. He claims that because he was in federal custody, the State 
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should have filed a detainer with the federal government and obtained temporary 
custody before bringing him to trial. See id. at 14-15. Defendant also claims that 
because he was in federal custody, the State had to follow the provisions of the IAD 
to secure his attendance at state court proceedings. See id. He apparently argues 
that each time he was returned to the Cache County jail following a court 
appearance, he was returned to federal custody, thus violating the provisions of the 
IAD that proscribe shuttling of a defendant between the custody of one jurisdiction 
and the custody of another. See id. at 16-17. 
A. Defendant was not in federal custody. 
Defendant cites no authority to support his theory that he was in federal 
custody. Defendant's argument rests of the premise that a defendant being held by 
a state institution upon the request of a federal marshal is in federal custody. 
Defendant cites no authority for this underlying claim. For that reason alone, his 
argument is inadequately briefed and this Court should decline to review his claim. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring citation to record and authorities); State v. 
Thomas, 1999 UT 2, | 11-13, 974 P.2d 269 (stating that rule requires "substantive 
analysis''); State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 8,1 P.3d 1108 (providing that briefs may 
be disregarded or stricken for failure to comply with rule 24). 
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B. The federal government had not filed a detainer under the 
IAD. 
Moreover, defendant's claim—that the federal government had filed a 
detainer under the IAD that should have transferred him to federal custody —is 
contrary to the provisions of the IAD and without support. The federal government 
had filed a detainer/hold with the Cache County jail, but not a detainer governed 
by the IAD. The IAD addresses detainers lodged against a prisoner in order to 
bring that prisoner to trial on an indictment, information, or complaint in another 
jurisdiction that is pending during the defendant's prison term. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-5, art. III. It does not address holds for other purposes, such as the purpose 
for the federal marshal's hold in this case, i.e., to give the federal government 
opportunity to take custody of the defendant if and when a state institution decides 
to release him. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343 (stating that IAD applies only to transfers 
made to permit the prosecution of "untried charges pending against the prisoner"); 
State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151,1152 n.l (Utah App 1991) ("Detainers based on alleged 
parole or probation violations . . . are not based on untried charges and thus the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is inapplicable."). 
The detainer filed by the federal marshal in this case specifically advised that 
"[t]he notice and speedy trial requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
do NOT apply to this detainer, which is based on a Federal probation/supervised 
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release violation warrant.'7 R129 (federal hold) (capitalization and boldface in 
original) (reproduced in Addendum H). The hold did not request a transfer to 
federal custody, but advised that "[t]he United States District Court for the District 
of UTAH has issued an arrest warrant charging the subject with violation of the 
conditions of probation and/or supervised release" and asked that the jail, "[p]rior 
to the subject's release from [its] custody/' notify the United States Marshal's office 
"so that we may assume custody if necessary." Id. Thus, nothing in the detainer 
suggested that the federal government had taken custody of defendant at the Cache 
County jail. Nothing suggests that the marshal's hold had effected a transfer of 
defendant from state to federal custody. 
C. Defendant was in state custody because he no longer qualified 
for release on his state charges. 
Defendant, in fact, was not held at the jail because he had been transferred to 
federal custody, but because he no longer qualified for bail on his state charges. 
Under statutory law, a person may not be admitted to bail as a matter of right if he 
is charged with a "felony committed while on probation or parole . . . when the 
court finds there is substantial evidence to support the current felony charge." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-20-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The court stayed defendant's bond when it 
learned of the federal hold, which advised the court of defendant's status as a 
parolee. R38. At a subsequent hearing, the court found "substantial evidence of 
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crime [i.e., the criminal activity charged in this case] committed while on parole [in 
the federal case]/' found that the evidence sufficed to bind defendant over on the 
charges in this case, and revoked defendant's bail. R44.1 
As explained, a defendant is not entitled to release on bail where a court has 
determined that substantial evidence exists to show that the defendant has 
committed a state felony while on parole. The court denied release for that reason, 
not because defendant was in federal custody. 
D. Defendant was not "shuttled" between jurisdictions in 
violation of the IAD. 
One purpose of the IAD is to prevent a defendant's being unnecessarily 
"shuttled" back and forth between jurisdictions. Where a defendant is removed 
from prison in one state and sent to another state to face trial on pending charges 
and trial is not held on those charges prior to "the return of the prisoner to the 
original place of imprisonment," such charges must be dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, art. 111(e). 
Defendant apparently claims that he was shuttled back and forth between 
Utah courts and federal custody in violation of the IAD when, at the close of each 
1
 Defendant has not included transcripts of these hearings in the record on 
appeal. The State therefore can provide no further details on the trial court's 
analysis. 
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day of court proceedings, he was taken from the county courthouse to the Cache 
County jail and then back to the county courthouse for the next day of proceedings.2 
This claim rests on defendant's presumption that he was in federal custody at the 
Cache County jail. As explained, defendant was not in federal custody at the Cache 
County jail simply because the federal marshal had requested notification before 
defendant's release from that facility. Defendant's anti-shuttling claim fails because 
defendant never left state custody. He cannot show that when the State returned 
him to the Cache County jail following his various court appearances, the State 
returned him to federal custody and violated the provisions of the IAD. 
E. Utah courts had jurisdiction to try defendant. 
Finally, defendant claims that a violation of the IAD deprives a court of 
jurisdiction. See Br. Appellant at 9,15. Defendant provides no authority for this 
claim. While, under carefully delineated circumstances not present in this case, a 
violation of the IAD may require that a case be dismissed with prejudice, nothing in 
the IAD can be read to strip a court of jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5. 
Rather, as Utah courts have observed, "rights created by the IAD [] are statutory, 
2
 Defendant has set forth no authority to show that trial in a state court of a 
defendant held in federal custody within the same state violates the IAD. Because 
defendant has not shown that he was in federal custody, the State does not address 
that matter. 
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not fundamental, constitutional, or jurisdictional in nature." State v. Brocksmith, 888 
P.2d 703,705 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation and citation omitted); State v. Penman, 964 
P.2d 1157,1164 (Utah App. 1998) (same). Moreover, as explained, defendant has 
demonstrated no violation of the IAD. 
Defendant's claim that he was improperly brought to court and improperly 
shuttled between state and federal custody therefore fails. He cannot show that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction or that it should have dismissed the charges with 
prejudice. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS; ANY INITIAL SEARCH WAS 
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION AND 
THE INDEPEDENDENT POST-ARREST SEARCH WAS 
PERMISSIBLE AS A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND AS 
AN INVENTORY SEARCH 
Defendant next claims that "the trial court erred when [it] denied [his] motion 
to suppress evidence/' alleging that the police search of his vehicle was without 
probable cause and without consent. Br. Appellant at 19 (boldface omitted). He 
claims specifically that Officer Hansen had only reasonable suspicion to detain him, 
but not probable cause, because Officer Hansen " [wa]s not sure whether the person 
he detained had anything to do with the burglary/' Id. at 20. 
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Facts relevant to motion to suppress? Just before midnight on August 16/ 
2006, Officer Brad Hansen received a burglary call for an alarm that had been set off 
at the Top Stop convenience store on Tenth North and Main in Logan. R349:14-15; 
see also R244(PH):6. Officer Hansen traveled north on Main until he reached the 
convenience store, arriving within a minute or two of the alarm call. R349:15,17. 
He entered the store's parking lot on the south, drove his vehicle around the east 
side, and then continued to the north parking lot, stopping about midway through 
that lot. Id. As Officer Hansen drove up Main and into the parking lot, he did not 
see anyone jogging. R349:15, 43. 
As he parked his car, Officer Hansen noticed defendant running from the 
northwest corner of the building toward his police vehicle. R349:15-16. Defendant 
was wearing sweat pants and "sweating profusely/' R349:16. Officer Hansen asked 
defendant what he doing, and defendant said that he was "out for a jog." Id. 
3
 The trial court judge, who had presided at the preliminary hearing a month 
before the hearing on the motion to suppress, asked the parties to focus on when the 
officers entered defendant's truck. R349:13. He suggested that the parties not dwell 
on "the other facts leading up to that point." See R349:14. The State therefore 
supplements the facts presented at the suppression hearing with facts presented at 
the preliminary hearing, where useful for context. 
The transcript of the preliminary hearing is contained in Packet A of the 
record. Packet A also contains two other transcripts. The packet has been assigned 
record number 244 (R244). To distinguish the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
from the other two transcripts, the State refers to it as R244(PH). 
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Defendant said "that he was a truck driver and that he jog[ged] in between the 
routes to keep in shape/' Id. Officer Hansen told defendant why he was there and 
asked defendant whether he had seen anything. R244(PH):7; R349:16. Defendant 
said he had not. Id. Because of "the number of alarms [police receive] that are 
false/7 Officer Hansen let defendant go and defendant ran east. Id. 
Officer Hansen then continued his investigation at the Top Stop. As he drew 
closer to the building, he saw a crow bar, a large axe/sledge hammer, a hat, and a 
pair of gloves. R349:16-17. He noted that the lock to the door had been removed. 
R349:17. Damage to an ATM machine was visible through a window. R349:24.4 
Having seen evidence that a burglary had actually occurred, Officer Hansen 
began looking for defendant. R349:17. Defendant was the only person he had seen 
in the area when he arrived there within two minutes of receiving the alarm call, 
and defendant had approached him from the exact area where the door lock had 
been removed and the tools abandoned. R349:17-18. 
4
 It is not clear whether Officer Hansen saw the damaged ATM when he first 
saw the burglary tools and gloves or whether he saw it during a later investigation 
of the building. See R349:24. 
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Officer Hansen turned east and saw "a large semi truck, car hauler, parked in 
the . . . car wash parking lot" just east of the Top Stop. R349:18. Defendant was in 
the cab, the truck was running, and the dome light was on. R349:18,36. 
As Officer Hansen approached, defendant "came out of the vehicle, around 
the front of the truck, with his hands in the air," saying, "I didn't do it, I didn't do it, 
I didn't do anything." R349:19. Officer Hansen then asked defendant to sit on the 
ground. Id. Defendant "dropped his hands, but he continued to advance towards 
[the officer]." Id. Officer Hansen then pulled out his Tazer and again ordered 
defendant to sit on the ground. Id. This time defendant complied. Id. 
Officer Hansen called for backup because "the situation was not a safe 
situation at that point." R349:19. Backup Officer Ostermiller arrived and "started 
to deal with [defendant], talking with him, getting his name, information, so that we 
could verify who we had, who we were talking with at that point." R349:20. Officer 
Ostermiller ran inquiries that shortly returned information defendant "had a 
warrant for his arrest out of Salt Lake." R349:22. 
After Officer Ostermiller began getting defendant's information, Officer 
Robert Olsen arrived. R349:20. 
The initial inspection. Officers Hansen and Olsen then returned to the Top 
Spot to further investigate the crime scene. Id. After "walk[ing] around the 
sidewalk area of Tenth North looking for the lock" that had been popped off, Officer 
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Hansen walked over to the car wash parking lot to check out the semi-truck/car 
hauler. Id. He stepped up onto the driver's door area and found the driver's 
window was down. Id. He looked in and saw "miscellaneous tools in the passenger 
cab area of the truck," including a gas-powered chop saw. R349:20-22. 
While checking out the truck, Officer Hansen used a flashlight to illuminate 
the inside. R349:28. At some point, apparently as he focused the light on the floor 
and illuminated a glove, his hand holding the flashlight went through the open 
window. R349:28-29. Officer Hansen did not poke his head in, did not open the 
truck door, and did not touch anything in the truck. R349:22, 29-30. But, as he 
looked down onto the floor, he saw a blue glove similar to the gloves by the Top 
Spot. R349:29. 
When he got down, he informed defendant that "he was being detained for a 
possible burglary." R349:22. "At that point Officer Ostermiller also informed 
[Officer Hansen] that [defendant] had a warrant for his arrest out of Salt Lake." Id. 
The officers arrested defendant and transported him to the police department. 
R349:22-23. 
The post-arrest search. The truck was still running. R349:36. Because no one 
was there to pick it up, the officers performed a "safe keep" inventory to protect the 
vehicle before impounding it. R349:36-37. During the inventory the officers found 
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burglary tools, a computer identified as a computer taken from a Papa Murphy's 
burglary, and other evidence of criminal activity. R349:37-40. 
Proceedings below. On October 17, 2006, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence found in the truck and a supporting memorandum, and the 
trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. R94, 95-98,144-46; 349:7. The 
State called witnesses who testified to events that occurred on the night of the 
offense. RR349:7-49. 
After receiving this testimony, the trial court denied the motion to 
suppress. R349:49. The trial court ruled that defendant was properly detained. 
R349:48. The court stated that Officer Hansen's looking through the cab window 
was not"necessarily inappropriate/' but that"irrespective of whether the glove 
was seen or not seen by Officer Hansen, the defendant was . . . already legally in 
custody" and that "once the existence of the warrant was discovered anything 
thereafter was a search incident to an arrest, sufficient for an inventory purpose 
and consistent with further investigation of the burglary of the service station." 
R349:49. 
The trial court reconfirmed this ruling on the first day of trial. See R350:88-
89. The court stated, "I found that the detention of the defendant on a temporary 
basis was justified given all of the circumstances. And that there were articulable 
reasons to suspect that the defendant [may have been] involved in criminal 
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activities sufficient to detain him long enough to conduct the investigation, 
which resulted in the discovery of a warrant for his arrest and therefore he was 
arrested/7 R350:88. The trial court continued, "The search of the vehicle thereto 
was consistent with the fact that it was there remaining and was running and 
apparently belonged to the defendant and had to be seized and inventoried and 
protected/7 Id. 
Legal grounds apparent in the record. Officer Hansen's initial inspection 
of the truck, if a search, was a lawful search under the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement.5 The post-arrest search was lawful as a search incident 
to defendant's arrest on an outstanding warrant, and, as the trial court ruled, as 
an inventory search of an impounded vehicle. 
A. This Court should decline review of defendant's claim because 
it is inadequately briefed. 
Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to 
review it. 
Adequate briefing. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires 
an appellant's brief to set forth an argument that "contain[s] the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
5
 This Court may affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress on 
any basis apparent in the record. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f^ 10,52 P.3d 1158. 
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for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on/' It is not enough under this 
rule to superficially cite to authority; rather, the rule requires a " substantive 
examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ^ 11-13,974 
P.2d 269. "A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at f 11 (quotation and 
citations omitted). Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 6,1 P.3d 1108. Cf. United 
States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 (7th Or. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting 
for truffles buried in their briefs"). "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court/" Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44, If 8 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(k)). 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress evidence discovered in a search of his semi-truck. Br. Appellant at 19. 
Defendant notes that the "automobile exception" permits the warrantless search of a 
mobile vehicle where probable cause exists to believe that it contains evidence of a 
crime. See id. He concedes that his truck was mobile. See id. He contends, however, 
that probable cause was lacking to search the vehicle. He does not address any of 
the evidence suggesting that the truck might contain evidence but merely asserts 
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that the "officer admitted] that he [wa]s not sure whether the person he detained 
had anything to do with the burglary/7 Id. at 20. 
Defendant cites no authority for his implicit claim that probable cause 
requires the certainty, not the probability, that evidence will be found. Nor does he 
set forth the record evidence to which the officer testified and upon whicl^ the 
officer determined that evidence would likely be found in the truck. 
Thus, defendant has dumped the burden of research on the court, leaving the 
court to research both the record and the law and to analyze the record facts in light 
of the law. His claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to 
review it. 
B. Assuming a search occurred, the search was lawful under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
In any event, assuming that Officer Hansen inspection of defendant's semi-
truck cab through its open window was a search, the search was lawful under the 
automobile exception. 
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1. No Fourth Amendment search occurred. 
As a preliminary matter, the State does not concede that any search occurred. 
In some situations, an officer may discover evidence in "a situation in which there 
has been no Fourth Amendment search at all/' LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a) at 
448 (4th ed. 2004). This may occur where "an observation is made by a police officer 
without a prior physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area/' Id. 
In this case, Officer Hansen looked through the open window of defendant's 
semi-truck, which was idling in the car wash parking lot where defendant had 
parked it. R349:20-22,36. The chop saw and miscellaneous tools were visible from 
the window. R349:20-22. Officer Hansen also saw a blue glove in the floor area of 
the cab similar to the gloves by the Top Spot door. Id. 
Officer Hansen admitted that his hand passed through the plane of the open 
window when he used his flashlight to look down onto the floor where he saw the 
glove. R349:29. At that point, however, Officer Hansen had already seen the 
burglary tools in the truck's cab. R349:22, 24. Even assuming a search occurred 
when Officer Hansen's hand entered the open window, Officer Hansen had 
discovered the tools before that search, and evidence of the tools was not fruit of 
that search. Rather, discovery of the tools in the cab only increased the evidence 
supporting probable cause to believe that evidence of a burglary would be found in 
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the cab. As explained below, once Officer Hansen had probable cause, any search 
was permissible under the automobile exception.6 
2. If a search occurred, it was permissible under the 
automobile exception. 
Automobile exception. In most cases, police must seek a warrant before 
conducting a search. See Maiyland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (citing 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,390-91 (1985)). If, however, "a car is readily 
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania 
v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). Under "established precedent, the 
'automobile exception' has no separate exigency requirement/' Dyson, 527 U.S. 
at 466. This exception is based first "on the automobile's 'ready mobility' and 
second on "the individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile, 
owing to its pervasive regulation." Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
6
 Moreover, it appears that the only piece of evidence that Officer Hansen 
found after his hand passed through the window was the glove. R349:29. As the 
trial court observed, "[t]he discovery of the glove" was only "tangentially related" 
to the other evidence Officer Hansen saw looking through the window. R350:88. 
Failure to suppress evidence of the glove was, if anything, harmless error. See 
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.7(f) at 479 & n.264 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009) 
and cases cited therein. 
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Probable cause. "[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard" and 
"merely requires that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief,'... that certain items may be contraband or stolen 
property or useful as evidence of a crime[.]" Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,742 (1983) 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,162 (1925)). "[I]t does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Id. It requires 
simply "a reasonable ground for belief," Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,371 (2003), 
not "a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity," Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). In other words, "[t]he process" of calculating 
probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Brown, 
460 U.S. at 742. 
"The determination of whether probable cause exists" for a warrantless search 
of a vehicle "depends upon an examination of all the information available to the 
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search 
was made." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986) (citing Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 
(1925) (probable cause is "a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances 
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which 
by law is subject to seizure and destruction"). "[A] police officer may draw 
inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists," 
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Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996), including inferences "that might 
well elude an untrained person/7 United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
Analysis. Here, defendant concedes that Officer Hansen had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant, see Br. Appellant at 20, and that the semi-truck was 
mobile, See id. at 19. Defendant argues, however, that Officer Hansen lacked 
probable cause to believe that defendant's semi-truck would contain evidence of the 
Top Stop burglary. 
Defendant's claim fails. An examination of all of the information known to 
Officer Hansen when he first looked through the truck's window demonstrates that 
he had probable cause to believe that the truck might contain evidence of the Top 
Spot burglary. First, only two minutes before he arrived on the scene, Officer 
Hansen had received an alarm call informing him that a burglary alarm had 
sounded at the business. R349:14-17. Second, he had seen evidence of a burglary at 
the Top Spot's northwest door. Outside that door, he saw burglary tools — a crow 
bar and a large axe/sledge hammer. R349:16-17. Moreover, he saw that the 
someone had popped out the door's lock. Id. These facts would warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that a burglary had occurred. 
Further, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe not only that a burglary 
had occurred, but also that defendant had been involved in the incident. Driving to 
the scene just before midnight, Officer Hansen had seen only one person anywhere 
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in the vicinity of the Top Spot. Id. That person, defendant, had come running 
toward Officer Hansen's car as Officer Hansen pulled into the Top Spot's north 
parking lot. Id. Defendant was running from the northwest corner of the Top Spot 
building, the place where Officer Hansen, prior to the search, found the burglary 
tools and the door with its lock popped out. R349:16-18. Defendant was sweating 
profusely, indicating that he had been engaged in some physically taxing activity. 
R349:16. While he claimed that he had been jogging, Officer Hansen had seen no 
one jogging in the area as he approached the scene. R349:15. In addition, the tools 
at the northwest door suggested that some physical exertion had been required to 
force entry. 
Officer Hansen, moreover, had probable cause to believe that the truck 
contained evidence of the crime. After allowing defendant to go, Officer Hansen 
had watched defendant run east. R349:16. When Officer Hansen then saw burglary 
tools and the popped-out lock by the Top Spot door and realized that this had not 
been a false alarm, he immediately looked for defendant. R349:17. He saw 
defendant sitting in a lighted semi-truck, parked and running in the car wash lot 
that abutted the Top Spot parking lot on the east. R244(PH):8; R349:18. Officer 
Hansen had probable cause to believe that defendant might have transported items 
used in the burglary or something taken in the burglary to the semi-truck. 
Defendant may have had additional burglary tools in the truck. He may have been 
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in the process of moving items out of the Top Spot into the truck and may have 
placed those items in the truck before Officer Hansen arrived on the scene. He may 
have secreted items taken from the Top Spot on his person and may have been 
carrying those items to the truck when Officer Hansen first spotted him. For all of 
these reasons, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe that the semi-truck 
might contain evidence of defendant's involvement in the crime. 
Further, as Officer Hansen approached the semi-truck, defendant jumped out 
and walked toward him, protesting, "I didn't do it. I didn't do it." R349:19. 
Defendant's unusual behavior suggested a consciousness of guilt. See Watson v. 
State, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex. App.) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum I). 
Finally, Officer Hansen had, as an additional basis for probable cause, the 
information he acquired when he first looked through the open truck window and 
saw the gas-powered chop saw and miscellaneous tools in the passenger cab area of 
the truck. R349:21-22,24. Officer Hansen could see these items, visible through the 
window, R349:24, before any search that may have begun when his hand entered 
the truck window. R349:28-29. 
In sum, because defendant was the only person near the Top Spot when 
Officer Hansen arrived, because Officer Hansen saw defendant there within minutes 
of the alarm, because defendant was coming from the area near the popped-lock 
door, because defendant's sweating would have been consistent with physical 
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exertion to break into the building, because defendant's behavior was so unusual, 
and because Officer Hansen could see the chop-saw and various other tools when 
he looked through the truck window, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe 
that defendant may have been involved in the burglary. The facts known to Officer 
Hansen were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
defendant was the person who had burglarized the Top Spot and in the belief that 
evidence of his involvement might be found within his semi-truck. 
Defendant claims that Officer Hansen "[wa]s not sure whether the person he 
detained had anything to do with the burglary" but "still entered t h e . . . truck/' Br. 
Appellant at 20. That is beside the point. As explained, probable cause "does not 
demand any showing that such [an officer's] belief be correct or more likely true 
than false/7 Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. It sufficed that Officer Hansen's belief was 
reasonable. 
Because Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe that the truck contained 
evidence of the burglary and because the truck was indisputably mobile, Officer 
Hansen's initial inspection or search of the truck was lawful. 
C Evidence was lawfully obtained independently of any 
information found in the initial search of the truck —first as a 
search incident to arrest, and second, as an inventory search. 
Even assuming that Officer Hansen's initial pre-arrest search oi defendant's 
vehicle was unlawful, the challenged evidence was admissible under the 
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independent source doctrine. Independent of any information found in the initial 
search, the officers arrested defendant on an outstanding warrant and lawfully 
searched his truck (1) in a search incident to that arrest and (2) in a pre-
impoundment inventory search. 
Independent source doctrine. Even where evidence is initially discovered 
during an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of the 
evidence discovered if the challenged evidence also has an independent source. The 
independent source doctrine applies "to evidence obtained for the first time during 
an independent lawful search" and also "to evidence initially discovered during, or 
as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from 
activities untainted by the initial illegality." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 
537 (1988). 
The United States Supreme Court explained the doctrine as a matter of public 
policy. "'[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the 
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are balanced 
by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in 
if no police error or misconduct had occurred '" Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (quoting 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (emphasis in Nix). The Court explained, 
"'When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such 
41 
evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in 
absent any error or violation/' Id. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). 
1. Running a warrants check unconnected with the initial 
search of the truck, Officer Ostermiller discovered an 
outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest Police lawfully 
arrested defendant on the basis of that warrant. 
After Officer Hansen had detained defendant, he called for backup. R349:19. 
Backup Officer Ostermiller arrived, took responsibility for obtaining defendant's 
information, and ran a warrants check. R349:20. While Officer Ostermiller 
remained with defendant and ran the warrants check, Officer Hansen returned to 
the Top Spot and then began looking in the open window of defendant's truck. 
R349:20-22. 
Officer Ostermiller's decision to run the warrants check was not prompted by 
anything that Officer Hansen saw during his initial search of the truck, but was part 
of his effort to obtain information about defendant—the assignment he undertook 
when the other officers left to further investigate the burglary. 
When Officer Hansen again joined Officer Ostermiller, Officer Ostermiller 
informed Officer Hansen that he had learned that defendant was wanted on an 
outstanding warrant out of Salt Lake. R349:22. Defendant was lawfully arrested on 
the basis of this outstanding warrant. 
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2. Officers lawfully searched defendant's truck in a search 
incident to defendant's arrest on an outstanding warrant. 
Evidence found in that search had a source independent of 
anything found in the initial search of the truck. 
Search incident to arrest. When a defendant is lawfully arrested, police may 
conduct a search incident to arrest. They need not have probable cause to believe 
that they will find arms or discover evidence. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,461 
(1981). "'A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search 
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification/" Id. (quoting United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile" and 
"also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger 
compartment." Id. at 460 (citation omitted). Moreover, a vehicle search incident to 
arrest is lawful even in circumstances where an arrestee has "exited his car before 
the officer initiated contact," that is, whether the arrestee is an "occupant" or a 
"recent occupant" of the car, as was the case here. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 621-22 (2004). 
Having arrested defendant in this case, officers were entitled to search the cab 
of the truck incident to that arrest. And it was during that search that the officers 
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seized the burglary evidence inside the cab. The evidence the officers found in the 
search incident to arrest therefore had a source independent of evidence discovered 
during any initial truck search. That evidence, the product of the outstanding 
warrant, was admissible under the "independent source" doctrine. 
3. Alternatively, officers conducted a lawful inventory search 
of the truck following defendant's arrest on his 
outstanding warrant. Evidence found in the inventory 
search had a source independent of anything found in the 
initial search of the truck. 
Inventoiy searches. Alternatively, where police legally arrest a defendant 
who is driving a car, they may inventory the car prior to impounding it. 
"[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment/7 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). "The 
policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, 
nor is the related concept of probable cause/' Id. (citation omitted). Rather, 
"inventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the 
custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, 
and to guard the police from danger." Id. at 372. The United States Supreme Court 
"has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or 
otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or 
protecting the car and its contents." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 
(1976). 
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Here, after arresting defendant on his outstanding warrant, police inventoried 
the truck he had been driving. Officer Scott Bodily testified that at the time 
defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant, his truck was still running. 
R349:36. "[N]o one was there to pick it up so the truck needed to be safe[-]keep[-] 
inventoried to protect the vehicle itself/' Id. "[A]t the very least an inventory of the 
contents of the vehicle needed to be done prior to that impound/ ' R349:36-37. 
During the inventory, the officers discovered evidence of defendant's involvement 
in the burglary and in other crimes. See R349:37-38 (noting chop saw, bolt cutter, 
computer taken from a Papa Murphy's burglary, etc.). 
Again, defendant claims that the initial pre-arrest truck inspection was 
unlawful and that "[a]U items found in the truck should have been excluded from 
evidence." Br. Appellant at 21. Assuming arguendo that evidence in the truck "was 
initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search," that 
evidence was "later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial 
illegality." Murray, 487 U.S. at 537. Because the inventory search was conducted 
independently from any alleged illegality, the evidence found in the inventory 
search was admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If the 
Court finds that it has jurisdiction, it should affirm defendant's conviction because 
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defendant has not shown that the State violated the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers or that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence found in 
the truck. 
Respectfully submitted February £S, 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE f 3 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Section 77-29-5 Page 1 of4 
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77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers -- Enactment into law - Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state 
with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already 
incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this 
agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of 
the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. 
The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when 
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative 
procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or 
possession of the United States; District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he 
initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for 
custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information 
or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof. 
ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional 
institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is 
pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which 
a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he 
shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the 
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a 
final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause 
shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term 
of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to 
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the 
prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be 
given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall 
promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also 
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inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or 
complaint on which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall 
operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the 
basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting 
official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of 
corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate 
prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's 
request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any 
notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written 
notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint 
contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a paragraph (a) hereof shall 
also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated 
thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the 
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of 
imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by 
the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to 
effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the 
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final 
disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or 
complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and 
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V 
(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the 
appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court 
having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded 
and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt 
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the 
sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own 
motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the 
appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating 
the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility 
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities 
simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in 
the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with 
notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in 
open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may 
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
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(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he 
may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery 
may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the 
prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in 
a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in 
the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that 
speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the 
prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of 
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall 
be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in 
federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the 
custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall 
present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary 
custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the 
detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner 
has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in 
the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer 
has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending 
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease 
to be of any force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting 
prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or 
complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or 
charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and while being 
transported to or from any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in 
a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the 
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made 
available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to 
run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice 
of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is 
exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of 
the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as 
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until 
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such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one 
or more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall 
be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and 
returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned 
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and 
responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the 
government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, 
or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and 
IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the 
prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply 
to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of 
other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and 
provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has 
enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute 
repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any 
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, 
nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this 
agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is 
declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the 
applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of 
the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or 
circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held 
contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and 
effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
matters. 
Enacted by Chapter 15, 1980 General Session 
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order 
is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the 
court may order. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time. 
Addendum B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KENDALL SWENSON, 
Defendant. 
JURY VERDICT 
COUNTS 1-10 
Case No. 061100748 
We the jurors duly impaneled find the Defendant, KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON: 
COUNT/1: 
Not Guilty\)f Possession of a controlled substance, to wit: ^Cocaine, a Third Degree 
Guilty of Possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine, Third Degree Felony. 
Felony. 
COUNT 2: 
ot Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony. 
Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony. 
COUNT 3: 
/ Not Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony. 
V Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony. 
COUNT 4: 
Not guilty of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony. 
Guilty of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony. 
COUNT 5: 
Not guilty of Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor. 
Guilty of Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor. 
COUNT 6: 
Not guilty of Possession of Paraphernalia, within 1000 feet of a school, a class A 
misdemeanor. (^yUliMJl' t<0 MTPuLo^A HAAuCu^A^\4t Hj 
Guilty of Possession of Paraphernalia, within ICwOTeet of a school, a class A 
misdemeanor. 
COUNT 7: 
Not guilty of Theft, a third degree felony. 
Guilty of Theft, a third degree felony. 
COUNT 8: 
Jot guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor. 
Guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor. 
COUNT 9: 
Not guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony 
•* 70 
Guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony 
COUNT 10: 
Not guilty of Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor 
Guilty of Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor 
Dated: flfj^ 19 Z6Q(? 
Addendum C 
FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061100748 FS 
Judge: GORDON J LOW 
Date: March 5, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tracih 
Prosecutor: SWINK, JAMIE M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 28, 1963 
Video 
Tape Count: 4:04 
CHARGES 
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
4. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
5. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
7. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
<8. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
9. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
3rd Degree Felony 
Class A Misdemeanor 
3rd Degree Felony 
3rd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 061100748 
Date: Mar 05, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF -
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders felony and misdemeanor charges to run concurrent at 
Utah State Prison. Court reccommends credit for time served. 
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Case No: 061100748 
Date: Mar 05, 2007 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court orders restitution in the amount of $5,210.00, 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF -
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY 
TOOLS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 180 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
Charge # 4 
Charge # 5 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$4275.00 
$9275.00 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$4275.00 
$9275.00 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$4275.00 
$9275.00 
$ 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 1 5 0 . 0 0 
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Date: Mar 05, 2007 
Due: $4650.00 
Charge # 7 
Charge # 8 
Charge # 9 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$4275.00 
$9275.00 
Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $42 75.0 0 
Due: $9275.00 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$4275.00 
$9275.00 
Charge # 10 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $875.00 
Due: $1875.00 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
Pay fine to The Court. 
$33500.00 
$0 
$28675.00 
$62175.00 
Plus Interest 
Dated t h i s iM day of M(X H f f t ^ 2 0 ^ 
— * . *". . . r 1 - L- •- " • V • — » .. l . 
^ON/Tf LOW; "; ^ :J* „- j ^ lp f l \
 C{ 
s t r ic t l ; Court; J u d ^ S /r,')/ ; A 
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Addendum D 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
KENDALL SWENSON 
Defendant 
ADDENDUM TO SENTENCE, 
JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061100748 FS 
Judge Low 
This matter is before the Court upon a Motion filed by the defense to amend 
the original Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment on the above referenced case. 
In response, this Court has addressed the motion with both counsel on 
previous occasions and on this the 27th day of July, 2007. In an effort to expedite 
the matter the Court issues the following Order and where applicable a 
recommendation to the Federal Board of Pardons and any other parties associated 
with this case. 
Subsequent to a jury trial conviction, on March 5,2007 this Court sentenced 
the above referenced defendant. Burglary Felony 3rd, two counts, 0-5 years each. 
Criminal Mischief Felony 3rd, 0-5 years. Theft By Receiving Stolen Property 
Felony 3rd, two counts, 0-5 years each. Manufacturing/Possession Burglary Tools 
class B Misdemeanor, 180 days. 
The Court ordered all counts to run concurrent and to be served at the Utah 
State Prison and recommended credit for time served. 
The Defendant has a pending Federal case, or is on Federal Parole any 
details of which this Court is uninformed. 
3V+ 
)\° A 
o A 
This Court had at the time of sentencing expressed the intention that this 
sentence is to run concurrent with any Federal court. This Order is in clarification 
that the state's case is not to run consecutive to any proceedings by the Federal 
authorities and that this sentence can be served concurrent at any applicable 
Federal institution or the Utah State Prison. 
Dated this^SH^Y of July, 2007 
BY THE 
IT ' 
*&l COURT ^tg. 
J</S 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 0S1100748 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE 
Third Pty Plaintiff 
448 E 6400 S. SUITE 300 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
By Hand DAVID M PERRY 
By Hand JAMIE M SWINK 
Dated this 3D day of y \\XXUL^ 20 OJ. 
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Addendum E 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kendall R. Swenson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070346-CA 
F I L E D 
( N o v e m b e r 1 , 2 0 07) 
2 0 0 7 UT App 3 5 9 
First District, Logan Department, 061100748 
The Honorable Gordon J. Low 
Attorneys: David M. Perry, Logan, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne. 
PER CURIAM: 
Kendall R. Swenson appeals from his convictions after a jury 
trial. This is before the court on its own motion for summary 
disposition based on lack of jurisdiction. 
Under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a 
notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the entry 
of the order appealed from. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In a 
criminal case, it is the sentence that constitutes the final 
judgment from which to appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 
f 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The " '[thirty]-day period for filing [a] 
notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is jurisdictional and 
cannot be enlarged by this [c]ourt.'" Id. H 5 (alterations in 
original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 
1984)) . 
Swenson was sentenced at a sentencing hearing on March 5, 
2 007. The trial court formally entered Swenson!s sentence in the 
record on March 14, 2007. Swenson filed his notice of appeal on 
April 20, 2007, thirty-seven days after the entry of his sentence 
and outside of the time to appeal. As a result, this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal. See id. 
Swenson argues, however, that an addendum to the sentence 
entered on July 30, 2 007, re-started his time to appeal. The 
rule governing amended judgments in Utah is well-settled: 
" [W]here a belated entry merely constitutes 
an amendment or modification not changing the 
substance or character of the judgment, such 
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which 
relates back to the time the original 
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge 
the time for appeal; but where the 
modification or amendment is in some material 
matter, the time begins to run from the time 
of the modification or amendment." 
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 11, 106 P.3d 729 (quoting Adamson 
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947)). 
Here, the addendum to the sentence did not constitute a 
material change. The addendum clarified that Swenson's state 
sentences were to run concurrently with any federal case ongoing. 
The clarification does not change the substance or character of 
the judgment, particularly since the failure to specify that the 
sentences were concurrent in the sentencing order was a mere 
oversight. As a clarification rather than a material change, the 
addendum is not sufficient to enlarge the time to appeal. 
Accordingly, Swenson's notice of appeal was untimely filed and 
this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. 
Dismissed. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
20070346-CA 2 
Addendum F 
FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061100748 FS 
Judge: GORDON J LOW 
Date: March 5, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tracih 
Prosecutor: SWINK, JAMIE M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 28, 1963 
Video 
Tape Count: 4:04 
3rd Degree Felony 
Class A Misdemeanor 
CHARGES 
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
4. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
5. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
7. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
8. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
9. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty 
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Case No: 061100748 
Date: Mar 05, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF -
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders felony and misdemeanor charges to run concurrent at 
Utah State Prison. Court reccommends credit for time served. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court orders restitution in the amount of $5,210.00. Court 
recommends that this sentence runs concurrent with federal 
sentence. 
Page 2 
Case No: 061100748 
Date: Mar 05, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF -
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY 
TOOLS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 180 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4275.00 
Due: $9275.00 
Charge # 3 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4275.00 
Due: $9275.00 
Charge # 4 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4275.00 
Due: $9275.00 
Charge # 5 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $2150.00 
Due: $4650.00 
Page 3 
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Date: Mar 05, 2007 
Charge # 7 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4275.00 
Due: $9275.00 
Charge # 8 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $875.00 
Due: $1875.00 
Charge # 9 Fine: $5000.0 0 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4275.00 
Due: $9275.00 
Charge # 10 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $875.00 
Due: $1875.00 
Total Fine: $29500 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $25275 
Total Principal Due: $54775 
Plus Interest 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Dated this / 2 day of hdonAJX/^ 
ORDON J LOW /TifitdBkui/^aA^on 
D i s t r i c t Cburt Judg^ 
\ 
V 
^ ^ 
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Addendum G 
* * * * * 
f * 4 .1 ' 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla/ 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Tampa Division. 
Steve BOWIE-MYLES, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America. 
Nos. 8.03-CR-437-T-17MAP, 8:06-CV-1161-T-
17MAP. 
July 26, 2006. 
Steve Bowie-Myles, Petersburg, VA, pro se. 
Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney's Office, 
Tampa, FL, for United States of America. 
ORDER 
ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICR District Judge. 
*1 This cause is before the Court upon Defendant's 
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly 
illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 
cv-l;cr-158). 
BACKGROUND 
On October 23, 2003, a grand jury in the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida returned a two count indictment 
charging Defendant Bowie-Myles with: (a) possess-
ing with intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or 
more of a mixture or substance containing a detect-
able amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled sub-
stance, while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, in violation of 46 App. 
U.S.C. S§ 1903(a) and 1903(g); 21 U.S.C. § 
960(b)(l)(B)(ii); and 18 U.S.C. §2 (Count One); and 
(b) conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five 
(5) kilograms or more of a mixture or substance con-
taining a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II 
controlled substance, while on board a vessel subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 
Page 1 
46 App. U.S.C. gg 1903(a). 1 of 112 1903(i). and 
1903(g); and 21 U.S.C. g 960(b)(l)(B)(ii) (Count 
Two).1*1 
FN1. The Indictment was sealed for reasons 
unrelated to the charges against Bowie-
Myles. A First superseding Indictment was 
returned on November 6, 2003. D-cr-27. As 
it relates to Defendant Bowie-Myles, the 
First Superseding Indictment was identical 
to the original Indictment. However, Defen-
dant Bowie-Myles entered a plea of guilty 
to-and was convicted on the charge con-
tained in-Count One of the original Indict-
ment (rather than to Count One of the First 
Superseding Indictment). D-cr-50; D-cr-54; 
D-cr-74; D-cr-82; D-cr-86; D-cr-148. At the 
time of sentencing, the First Superseding In-
dictment was dismissed pursuant to a motion 
by the Government. D-cr-82; D-cr-86. 
Therefore, the First Superseding Indictment 
will not be discussed further herein. 
On January 7, 2004, pursuant to a written plea 
agreement, D-cr-50, Defendant Bowie-Myles entered 
a plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment. D-cr-
54. The written plea agreement and the Rule 11 plea 
colloquy clearly established that Defendant Bowie-
Myles was pleading guilty to possessing with intent 
to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of a mixture 
or substance containing a detectable amount of co-
caine, a Schedule II controlled substance, while on 
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. g§ 1903(a) and 
1903(g); and 21 U.S.C. g 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). D-cr-50; 
D-cr-54. 
On May 14, 2004, the Court sentenced Defendant 
Bowie-Myles for his conviction on the charge con-
tained in Count One of the Indictment. D-cr-82. De-
fendant Bowie-Myles was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 168 months, a term of supervised 
release of five (5) years, and a special assessment of 
$100. D-cr-82; D-cr-86. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.)) 
On May 17, 2004, the criminal judgment was filed. 
D-cr-86. The criminal judgment correctly stated De-
fendant Bowie's sentence. The criminal judgment 
also correctly stated that Defendant Bowie Myles was 
convicted of Count One of the Indictment, and cor-
rectly cited the operative provisions of the United 
States Code, The criminal judgment also contained a 
citation to 46 App. U.S.C. g 1903(0. This additional 
citation was incorrect, but it was merely surplusage. 3 
"46:USC:1903(a)(g)." However, in setting forth the 
nature of the offense, the criminal judgment incor-
rectly stated that Defendant Bowie-Myles was con-
victed of "Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Dis-
tribute 5 Kilograms or More of Cocaine."D-cr-86. 
On May 27, 2004, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed a 
timely notice of appeal. D-cr-91. Defendant's appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit ("Eleventh Circuit") was assigned case 
number 04-12743-D. 
*2 On August 25, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit entered 
a per curiam order dismissing the appeal with preju-
dice. D-cr-118. The order of dismissal was issued as 
the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit. D-cr-118. De-
fendant Bowie-Myles did not file a petition for writ 
of certiorari seeking review in the Supreme Court. D-
cv-1 at 2. 
On June 20, 2005, the Court, acting sua sponte, en-
tered a First Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, 
D-cr-148, which corrected the clerical (or scrivener's) 
error contained in the initial criminal judgment. See 
Paragraph 4, above. The First Amended Judgment 
correctly described the nature of offense as "Posses-
sion with Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More 
of Cocaine."D-cr-148. There was no change in the 
sentence imposed. 
On June 22, 2006, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed the 
instant Section 2255 motion. D-cv-1. The Section 
2255 motion was signed and dated by Defendant 
Bowie-Myles on June 16, 2006. D-cv-1 at 17. On 
June 27, 2006, the Court entered an order directing, 
among other things that the Government file "an ab-
breviated response addressing the issue of whether 
the motion to vacate is timely under the AEDPA."D-
cv-2. 
MOTION TO VACATE IS UNTIMELY 
Page 2 
Section 2255 provides that a motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct sentence must be filed within one 
year of the time a judgment of conviction becomes 
"final." See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 116(1). When a defen-
dant appeals, but does not seek certiorari review in 
the Supreme Court, his conviction becomes "final" 
when the 90-day period for seeking certiorari review 
expires. See Clay v United Slates, 537 U.S. 522, 525 
(2003)("For purposes of starting the clock on § 
2255's one-year limitation period, ... a judgment of 
conviction becomes final when the time expires for 
filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate 
court's affirmation of the conviction."); see also 
Close v. United States, 336 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th 
Cir.2003) (same); Kaufman v. United States, 282 
F.3d 1336, 1339 (11 th Cir.2002)fetme). 
The Supreme Court's Rules make clear that the 90-
day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari 
runs from the time that a judgment is entered by the 
Court of Appeals. S.Ct. R. 13(3). As explained 
above, in this case, the Eleventh Circuit entered its 
judgment dismissing Defendant Bowie-Myles' appeal 
on August 25, 2004. The time for filing a petition for 
a writ of certiorari expired 90 days later, on Novem-
ber 23, 2004. This is the date on which Defendant's 
judgment became "final," within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 11 6(1), and the one-year limitation 
period began to run. Therefore, Defendant's Section 
2255 motion would be timely only if it were filed on 
or before November 23, 2005, which is the date that 
he signed it. 
As explained above, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed 
the instant Section 2255 motion with the Court on 
June 22, 2006. However, the Eleventh Circuit has 
held that a prisoner's pro se Section 2255 motion is 
deemed "filed" on the date that it is delivered to 
prison authorities for mailing. See Adams v. United 
States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir.1999); 
Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 
(11thCir.200n. The Eleventh Circuit has further has 
held that absent evidence to the contrary, it is to be 
assumed that a Section 2255 Defendant's motion was 
delivered to prison authorities or the date that he 
signed it. Washington, 243 F.3d at 1301. 
*3 Defendant Bowie-Myles' Section 2255 motion is 
deemed to have been "filed" on June 16, 2006, which 
is the date that he signed it. As explained above, the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
slot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.)) 
one year limitation period expired on November 23, 
2005. Therefore, Defendant Bowie-Myles' Section 
2255 motion is almost seven months out of time. 
The Entry of the Amended Judgment Did Not 
Restart Section 2255's One-Year Limitation Pe-
riod 
The Court, acting sua sponte, entered an amended 
judgment on June 20, 2005. The change in the judg-
ment, however, was merely clerical in nature; it did 
nothing more than correct a scrivener's error. As ex-
plained above, the Court amended the judgment by 
changing the description of the offense of conviction. 
The change in the judgment was insignificant and did 
not affect-adversely or otherwise-any of Defendant 
Bowie-Myles' substantial rights. As explained above, 
the original judgment correctly stated that Defendant 
Bowie-Myles had been convicted of Count One of 
the Indictment, and the operative statutory provisions 
were properly cited therein. Most importantly, the 
sentence imposed by the Court was correctly set forth 
in the original judgment. The brief (13-word) de-
scription of the offense of conviction, under the head-
ing "NATURE OF OFFENSE," admittedly was 
wrong. However, if the first two words of the de-
scription, "conspiracy to," had been omitted, the 
original judgment would have been correct and an 
amendment would not have been necessary. 
The deletion of the words "conspiracy to" in the 
amended judgment was a simple clerical change cor-
recting a scrivener's error. Rule 36. Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, provides that "the court may at 
any time correct a clerical error in a judgment... aris-
ing from oversight or omission.'The Eleventh Circuit 
repeatedly has held that the correction of the offense 
of conviction in a criminal judgment is clerical in 
nature. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 
1247, 1253 (11th Cir.l999)("the judgment reflects 
the incorrect offense, ... which we regard as simply a 
clerical error"); United States v. De La Rosa-
Hernandez, 157 Fed. Appx. 219 filth 
Cir.2005)(unpublished)(fact that judgment incor-
rectly references count of conviction as possession-
instead of conspiracy to possess-is a "clerical error"). 
Indeed, in addressing a judgment that incorrectly 
referenced a crime entirely unrelated to the offense of 
conviction (and cited a statutory subsection that did 
not exist), the Eleventh Circuit held: 
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The judgment entered in this case indicates that [the 
defendant] was convicted of "18 U.S.C. § 911(g) 
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon.'The 
section reference is a scrivener's error.Section 9\ 1 
involves the crime of falsely impersonating a federal 
officer or employee, and that statutory provision has 
no subsections. [The defendant] was actually indicted 
for, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, violating 
18 U.S.C. g 922(g), which is the provision prohibit-
ing the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.... The judgment should be amended accord-
ingly.... 
*4 United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 
(11th Cir.l997)(emphasis added). The Eleventh Cir-
cuit further has held that when the district court cor-
rects an error in a criminal judgment pursuant to Rule 
36, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to 
appeal the judgment does not begin anew. In United 
States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161(11th Cir.2004), the 
district court corrected a clerical error in the restitu-
tion provision of a criminal judgment. Thereafter, the 
defendant appealed the restitution portion of the 
amended judgment. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the appeal was un-
timely, pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1)(A), Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, because the defendant should 
have appealed the restitution order in the original 
judgment (which he did not do). The correction of the 
clerical error did not provide the defendant with a 
second opportunity to appeal the judgment. Id. at 
1166. 
Although there does not appear to be an Eleventh 
Circuit case squarely addressing whether the correc-
tion of a clerical error with an amended judgment 
restarts the one-year limitation provision of Section 
2255 1^ 6(1), the logic of Portillo clearly indicates that 
it does not. After all, the Supreme Court has held that 
a judgment of conviction becomes "final," for pur-
poses of Section 2255, when the defendant's opportu-
nity for direct appeal of his conviction has been ex-
hausted. See Clay v. United States, 537 U .S. 522, 
527-28 (2003). 
Furthermore, the other courts that have addressed this 
narrow issue appear to have held uniformly that when 
a case is remanded for a ministerial reason or for the 
correction of a clerical error (or when the district 
court sua sponte corrects a clerical error in a judg-
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ment), the one-year limitation period of Section 2255 
does not begin anew when the district court corrects 
performs the ministerial directive of the appellate 
court or corrects the clerical error. See United States 
v. Wilson, 256 F.3d 217. 219-20 (4th Cir.2001)( 
Section 2255 limitation period not restarted when the 
district court performs the ministerial task of vacating 
one count on remand); United States v Dodson, 291 
F.3d 268. 275 (4th Cir.2002)(Section 2255 limitation 
period does not begin anew when "appellate court ... 
remands for a ministerial purpose that could not re-
sult in a valid second appeal"); United States v. 
Greer, 79 Appx. 974 (9th Cir.2003)(unpublished)(a 
district court's sua sponte amendment of a judgment, 
which did not make any change to the legally opera-
tive sentence, did not restart Section 2255's limitation 
period); United States v. Haves, 2006 WL 851184 
(E.D.La. March 13. 2006)("remand for ministerial 
purposes does not toll the period for filing a habeas 
petition because the defendant would have no legiti-
mate grounds for direct appeal of the district court's" 
amended judgment); see also Richardson v. Bram/ey, 
998 F.2d 463. 465 (7th Cir.1993X4Ta1 judgment is 
not final if the appellate court has remanded the case 
to the lower court for further proceedings, unless the 
remand is for a purely "ministerial" pur-
pose")(emphasis added). 
*5 In sum, the Court's sua sponte amendment to the 
judgment, which did nothing more than correct a 
clerical or scrivener's error, did not restart Section 
2255's one-year limitation period. Therefore, as ex-
plained above, Defendant Bowie-Myles' conviction 
became "final," for purposes of Section 2255. on 
November 23, 2004, when the 90-day period for fil-
ing a petition for writ of certiorari expired. Pursuant 
to Section 2255 <|f 6(1). Defendant Bowie-Myles had 
until November 23, 2005, to file a Section 2255 mo-
tion. The instant motion, "filed" (under the Eleventh 
Circuit's mailbox rule) on June 16, 2006, was almost 
seven months out of time. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that extraordinary 
circumstances entitle him to equitable tolling. 
Accordingly, the Court orders: 
That Defendant Bowie-Myles' motion to vacate (Doc. 
cv-1; cr-158) is denied, with prejudice. The Clerk is 
directed to enter judgment against Bowie-Myles in 
the civil case and to close that case. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant is not 
entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute enti-
tlement to appeal a district court's denial of his peti-
tion. 28 U.S.C. g 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court 
must first issue a certificate of appealability 
(COA).W."A [COA] may issue ... only if the appli-
cant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right/'W . at § 2253(c)(2). To make 
such a showing, defendant "must demonstrate that 
reasonable jurists would find the district court's as-
sessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 
wrong," Tennardv. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) 
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel 529 U.S. 473, 484 
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate 
to deserve encouragement to proceed further,' " 
Miller-El v, Cockrell 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) 
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 
(1983)). Defendant has not made the requisite show-
ing in these circumstances. 
Finally, because Defendant is not entitled to a certifi-
cate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in 
forma pauperis. 
ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on July 26, 2006. 
M.D.Fla.,2006. 
Bowie-Myles v. U.S. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 
(M.D.Fla.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum H 
U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Marshals Service 
DETAINER 
BASED ON VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND/OR SUPERVISED RELEASE 
UNITED STATES MARSHAL 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Please type or print neatly: 
T O :
 CACHE COUNTY JAIL 
ATTN: BOOKING/DETAINERS 
1225 W VALLEY VIEW, STE #100 
LOGAN. UT 84321 
DATE: 
SUBJECT: 
AKA: 
DOB/SSN: 
SEPTEMLER / , 2C06 
SWENSON, KENDALL ROSSEL 
0 3 / 2 8 / 6 3 
USMS#: 07002-081 
CR#: 2:03CR135?GC 
Please accept this Detainer against the above-named subject who is currently in your custody. The United States 
District Court for the D'Stnct of UTAH has issued an arrest 
warrant charging the subject with violation of the conditions of probation and/or supervised release. 
Prior to the subject's release from your custody, please notify this office at once so that we may assume custody if 
necessary. If the subject is transferred from your custody to another detention facility, we request that you forward 
out Detainer to said facility at the time of transfer and ad\ise this office as soon as posSib:c. 
The nonce and speedy trial requirements of (he Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act do NOT apply to this 
Detainer, which is based on a Federal probation/supervised release violation warrant-
Please acknowledge receipt of this Detainer, in addition, piease provide one copy of the Detainer to the subject 
and icturn one ^>py of the Detainer to this office in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. 
Very truly yours, 
RANDALL D. ANDERSON 
United Stater Marshal 
BY: LAURA JOHNSON / 
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH SPEC 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 4 - 3 4 0 4 
( 8 0 J ) 5 2 4 - 5 1 3 4 FAX 
nmmei 
PRIOR EDITIONS ARF OBSOLETE AN'D >OTTOBE USED 
Torm USM-16d 
Esi 11/98 
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m l& «• # 
West law 
Not Reported in S.W.2d 
Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.-Ho 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.))) 
C 
^^^ Only the Westlaw citation is currently avail-
able. 
NOTICE: NOT DESIGNATED FOR 
PUBLICATION. UNDER TX R RAP RULE 47.7, 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS HAVE NO 
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE BUT MAY BE CITED 
WITH THE NOTATION "(not designated for publi-
cation)." 
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.). 
Michael Lawrence WATSON, Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE of Texas, Appellee. 
No. 01-97-00526-CR. 
Jan. 21, 1999. 
On Appeal from the 177th District Court, Harris 
County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 737004. 
Panel consists of Chief Justice SCHNEIDER and 
Justices NUCHIA and HOLLINGSWORTH. 
OPINION 
HOLLINGSWORTH.m 
FN1. The Honorable Cynthia Hollingsworth, 
former Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth Dis-
trict of Texas at Dallas, participating by as-
signment. 
*1 The appellant waived his right to a jury trial, en-
tered a plea of not guilty to the felony offense of pos-
session of cocaine, and was tried before the court. 
The court found him guilty as charged, enhanced 
with two prior felony convictions, and assessed pun-
ishment at confinement for ten years in prison. At 
issue is the legality of the warrantless search and the 
sufficiency of evidence to support the conviction. 
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. (1 Dist.)) 
TESTIMONY 
On November 5, 1996, Officer Calvin Johnson went 
to the Fantasy Motel Inn with several other officers to 
serve a grand jury subpoena on the appellant. The 
officers were members of the "Achilles Group" 
which focuses on three-time, violent offenders and 
investigates felons that are armed or dealing in guns. 
The Achilles Group was investigating the appellant in 
connection with a case involving illegal possession of 
firearms. 
The officers asked the manager if the appellant was at 
the motel. The manager told them that the appellant 
was in room 105 and gave them a receipt which 
showed that appellant had rented room 105. The offi-
cers knocked on the door to room 105 and announced 
that they were Houston police officers. They knocked 
several times and waited several minutes. During that 
time, the officers could hear male and female voices 
whispering and they could hear someone moving 
around the room. A woman peered through the win-
dow coverings and asked them what they wanted. 
They repeated that they were police officers and told 
her they needed to talk to the appellant. She told them 
to wait while she dressed. 
Two more minutes passed before the woman opened 
the door. She stepped outside the door and told them 
the appellant was in the bathroom. Officer Johnson 
testified that he smelled a strong odor of burning 
marijuana as soon as the woman opened the door. He 
heard the sound of the toilet flushing, and he could 
hear water running in the sink. The officers called for 
the appellant several times. The appellant came out of 
the bathroom with his hands over his head and low-
ered himself to the ground. The officers entered the 
room to secure it and to be certain there were no 
other people in the room and no weapons within the 
appellant's reach. 
Officer Johnson testified that near the bathroom he 
smelled fresh marijuana. He looked in the bathroom 
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and saw a green, leafy substance swirling around in 
the toilet bowl which he recognized as marijuana. 
The water was still running in the sink. He turned off 
the water and, with the aid of his flashlight, saw a 
glass vial in the drain hole which he recognized as a 
"crack pipe." The officers dismantled a portion of the 
plumbing associated with the sink to retrieve the 
pipe. A white, powdery substance found in the pipe 
proved to be cocaine. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
In his first three points of error, the appellant com-
plains of the denial of his motion to suppress evi-
dence found in his motel room after a warrantless 
search. The appellant argues that there were no exi-
gent circumstances justifying the officers' search of 
the motel room. He alternatively argues that even if 
there were exigent circumstances, the search was 
nevertheless invalid because the officers should have 
terminated the search once the appellant and the 
premises were secured. 
Standard of Review 
*2 At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole 
judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to 
be given their testimony. Romero v. Stale, 800 
S.W.2d 539. 543 rTex.Crim.App. 1990). Absent an 
abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings should 
not be disturbed. Covarrubia v. State. 902 S.W.2d 
549, 553 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Distl 1995, pet, 
refd). We do not engage in our own factual review. 
Instead, viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the trial court's ruling, we consider only 
whether the trial court improperly applied the law to 
the facts. Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543; Covarrubia, 
902S.W.2dat553. 
The trial court found that the search of the appellant's 
motel room was justified because the officers had 
probable cause to believe the room contained evi-
dence of a crime, and exigent circumstances existed 
which made it impractical to obtain a warrant. 
Warrantless Search 
The officers conducted a search when they entered 
the motel room without the consent of the appellant. 
Taylor v. State, 945 S.W.2d 295. 298 n. 1 (Tei.App.-
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(1 Dist.)) 
Houston ri st Dist.] 1997, pet, refd) (a motel room is 
the equivalent of a home in the context of search and 
seizure law). To justify a warrantless search, the State 
must demonstrate probable cause existed at the time 
the search was made, and the existence of exigent 
circumstances which made the procuring of a warrant 
impracticable. TEX.CODE CRIM. P. ANN, art. 
14.05 (Vernon Supp.1999). 
Probable Cause 
Probable cause to search exists when reasonably 
trustworthy facts and circumstances within the 
knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a 
person of reasonable prudence to believe that the 
instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will 
be found. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101. 106 
fTex.Crim.App.1991). In McNauy, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals concluded that the police had prob-
able cause to conduct a warrantless search of defen-
dant's mobile home where the police had detected the 
odor of methamphetamine emanating from the home, 
they had heard the back door of the home opening 
and people running out the back, and they knew there 
was another methamphetamine laboratory nearby. 
McNairy, 835 S.W.2d at 106. The odor of marijuana 
can supply probable cause for a warrantless arrest. 
Is am v. State, 582 S.W.2d 441, 444 
(Tex.Crim.App.1979); Jackson v. Stale, 745 S.W.2d 
394. 396 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Distl 1987, pet, 
refd). 
Here, Officer Johnson testified that he detected a 
strong odor of burning marijuana as soon as the 
woman opened the motel door. Bolh officers testified 
that there was an odor of marijuana on or about her 
person. Officer Johnson heard the appellant flushing 
the toilet and running the water in the sink and be-
lieved that the appellant may have been destroying 
contraband. Based on these facts, the officers had 
probable cause to enter the motel room. 
Exigent Circumstances 
*3 The officers were justified in entering the motel 
room without consent or a search warrant because 
they had probable cause to believe marijuana was in 
the room. Exigent circumstances are present where 
an officer perceives a danger to himself or others, a 
danger that the suspect will escape, or a danger that 
evidence will be destroyed. McNairy, 835 S.W.2d at 
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107. The officers could not determine whether a third 
person was in the room or in the bathroom. Two offi-
cers testified that the appellant was under investiga-
tion for the illegal possession of a firearm, that he 
was a three-time felon, having been convicted of vio-
lent crimes, and that he had been arrested for at-
tempted murder. The officers heard the appellant 
running water and flushing the toilet in the bathroom. 
Combined with the odor of the marijuana, the delay 
in opening the door, and the fact that the officers 
heard the appellant and his female companion mov-
ing around and whispering, the sound of the running 
water and flushing toilet gave the officers reason to 
believe that evidence was being destroyed. The re-
cord supports a finding that a warrantless search of 
the motel room was justified by exigent circum-
stances. 
Protective Search 
The seizure of the crack pipe and the marijuana was 
permissible because the evidence was found in plain 
view during a legitimate protective sweep pursuant to 
a lawful investigative detention. A police officer in 
circumstances short of probable cause for arrest may 
justify temporary detention for the purpose of inves-
tigation which is a lesser intrusion upon personal 
security than arrest. Ramirez v. State, 672 S.W.2d 
480, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). A temporary deten-
tion is justified when the detaining officer has spe-
cific articulable facts, which taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, lead him to con-
clude that the person detained actually is, has been, or 
soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Woods v. 
State, 956 S.W.2d 33. 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 
The smell of burning marijuana justifies further in-
vestigation to determine whether an offense is being 
committed in an officer's presence. Jackson, 745 
S.W.2d at 395. The police were justified in detaining 
the appellant and his companion on the basis of the 
odor of burning marijuana in the room. 
Officer Johnson testified he had reason to believe that 
the appellant may have been in possession of weap-
ons because that was the reason for the investigation. 
An officer may conduct a limited search when an 
officer has a reasonable belief, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that a suspect is dangerous and may 
gain immediate control of weapons. Michigan v. 
Lone. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049. 103 S.Ct. 3469. 3480-81, 
77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Watson v. State, 861 
S.W.2d 4\0 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, pet, refd). A 
protective search for weapons may extend beyond the 
person even in the absence of probable cause. Id. 
*4 An officer may seize what he sees in plain view if 
he is legally permitted to be at the place from which 
the evidence is visible. Miller v. State, 608 S.W.2d 
684, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Under the "plain 
view" doctrine, a warrantless seizure by police of 
private possessions is permitted when: (1) the police 
officer lawfully makes the initial intrusion, and (2) it 
is immediately apparent to the police officer that the 
items he observes may be evidence of a crime, con-
traband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Green v. 
State, 866 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.App.-Houston fist 
Dist.l 1993. no pet). 
Officer Johnson lawfully looked into the bathroom 
pursuant to a protective search following an investi-
gative detention. He smelled an odor of fresh mari-
juana and saw marijuana swirling in the toilet bowl. 
Turning off the water, Officer Johnson looked down 
the drain in the sink where he saw a crack pipe in the 
drain in plain view. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overrul-
ing the motion to suppress. The appellant's first three 
points of error are overruled. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
In his fourth and fifth points of error, the appellant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
his conviction. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for legal sufficiency of evi-
dence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clewis v. State, 
922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (citing 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The appellate court does not 
review the fact finder's weighing of the evidence. 
Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134. In reviewing the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals 
should not substitute its judgment for that of the fact 
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finder and should set aside the judgment only if it is 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis, 922 
S.W.2dat129, 133. 
Affirmative Link to Controlled Substance 
The appellant argues that the evidence was legally 
insufficient because he was not "affirmatively 
linked" to the cocaine. To support a conviction for 
the felony offense of possession of a controlled sub-
stance, the State had the burden to prove the appel-
lant knowingly or intentionally possessed a con-
trolled substance. That is, that the appellant exercised 
care, control, or management over the cocaine, and 
that the appellant knew that what he was carrying 
was contraband. Hurt ado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 
743 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.1 1994, pet, refd); 
seeTEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 
481.102(3)(D), 481.115(a) (Vernon Supp.1999). Cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient if the combined and 
cumulative effect of all incriminating circumstances 
point to the defendant's guilt. Sosa v. State, 845 
S.W.2d479, 483 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Dist.1 1993. 
pet, refd). Evidence which affirmatively links the 
appellant to the contraband in such a manner that a 
reasonable inference arises that he knew of its exis-
tence and whereabouts is sufficient. Palmer v. State, 
857 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Dist.1 
1993, no pet). 
*5 In determining if sufficient affirmative links exist, 
a reviewing court can examine such circumstantial 
factors as the amount of contraband found, its loca-
tion in relationship to the defendant's personal be-
longings, the defendant's relationship to other persons 
with access to the premises, incriminating statements, 
and proximity of the defendant to the contraband. 
Villegas v. State, 871 S.W.2d 894. 896 (Tex.App.-
Houston [1st Dist.1 1994, pet, refd). Other facts to 
consider include: 1) whether the defendant was at the 
place searched at the time of the search; 2) whether 
there were other persons present at the time of the 
search; 3) whether the contraband was found in a 
closet that contained men's clothing, if the defendant 
is male; 4) whether the amount of contraband found 
was large enough to indicate the defendant knew of 
its existence; and 5) whether there is evidence estab-
lishing the defendant's occupancy of the premises. 
Classe v. State, 840 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex.App.-
Houston [1st Dist.1 1992. pet, refd). 
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Here, the appellant rented the motel room in his 
name. He had convenient access to the contraband, 
the appellant was in the bathroom when his female 
companion opened the door. The contraband was in 
plain view, swirling in the toilet bowl and suspended 
in the plumbing of the sink. The fact that the water 
was still swirling in the toilet bowl and the water in 
the sink was still running indicated that the appellant 
was the person who put the contraband in those 
places. Drug paraphernalia was in plain view, sitting 
on the dresser in the motel room. The motel room and 
the bathroom had a strong residual odor of marijuana, 
both burnt and fresh. The appellant came out of the 
bathroom with his hands raised and lowered himself 
to the floor before the officers even asked him to do 
so, indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
The evidence was legally sufficient to support a find-
ing that the appellant intentionally and knowingly 
possessed the cocaine. The finding of guilt based on 
the evidence is not so contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and 
unjust. 
The appellant's fourth and fifth points of error are 
overruled. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist), 1999. 
Watson v. State 
Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.-
Hous. (1 Dist.)) 
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